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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent I Appellant, Ballard Smith, hereinafter "Ballard," has previously set

forth the Nature of the Case in his Appellant's Brief and need not restate it herein.

B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE MAGISTRATE COURT
Ballard has previously set forth the Course of Proceedings in the Magistrate Court
in his Appellant's Brief and need not restate it herein.

C.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Ballard has previously set forth the Course of Proceedings in the District Court in
his Appellant's Brief and need not restate it herein.

D.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Any disputed facts arising out of Respondent's Brief that need to be clarified will
be discussed in Ballard's Argument herein.

Vll

ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CLEARLY ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE SALT LAKE PROPERTY
Charlie admits in her Respondent' Brief as follows:
Charlie does not dispute that as of the date of divorce the deed to the
property (e.g. Salt Lake Property) was in the name of Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 38). Given this undisputed fact, there is absolutely no legal
avenue by which the magistrate court presiding over the parties' divorce action could
obtain jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property, as it was owned by a third party entity
(Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., a California Corporation). The Utah Statute of Frauds
controls because the Salt Lake Property is located entirely within the boundaries of the
state of Utah. Utah Code§ 25-5-1 provides:
25 ..5.. 1. Estate or interest in real property.
No state or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.

Because Ballard and Charlie have never had the Salt Lake Property deeded in their
names, either individually or jointly, by statute, they have never had an interest in the Salt
Lake Property. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-906, the Salt Lake Property
cannot be community property as it was never acquired by the parties during marriage.
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Idaho Code§ 32-712 only gives a magistrate court presiding in a divorce action in the
state ofldaho jurisdiction over community property. See, Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho
1026, 712 P.2d 727 (App. 1985). Charlie's Second Am.ended Petition to Modify Order
Pursuant to Rule 809 seeks relief solely as to the Salt Lake Property. Because the
magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property, the district court erred
when it affirmed that the magistrate court had jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property.
Charlie has failed to cite any statutes or caselaw in support of her argument that
the district court did not err when it affirmed the magistrate court because no statute or
caselaw exists that would even remotely suggest that the magistrate court had jurisdiction
over the Salt Lake Property.
A.

A corporation and its stockholders are separate and distinct entities.
Charlie, the magistrate court and the district court failed to recognize that an

individual owning stock in a corporation is separate and distinct from that corporation.
The same is true in regard to limited liability companies and its members. Judge Day
recognized this when he ruled on the record at the April 20, 2007 hearing as follows:
THE COURT: I really like these issues to be resolved by the parties in
this forum, just for judicial economy. Frankly, it is not something I think
this court has jurisdiction over. This court has jurisdiction over, presently,
the stock of -- what is it -- Sun Mountain -MR. PICA: Sun Mountain Broadcasting.
MR. BOHN: Sun Mountain Broadcasting.
THE COURT: Sun Mountain Broadcasting, that's what we have
jurisdiction over, and not over the real property or over the acts ofB & C
Realty, LLC.
(R. p. 491, p. 13, L. 17 - p. 14, L. 2).
In Geogahagan v. Geogahagan, 24 N.C.App. 247,803 S.E.2d 172 (App. 2017),
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the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated an equitable distribution order in a divorce
action where a separate legal entity owned by the parties, but not a party to the divorce
action, was affected by a distribution order holding:
We recognize that BBPI is wholly owned by Plaintiff and Defendant,
and the subsidiary LLCs are, in tum, owned by BBPI. However, "[a]
corporation, even one closely held, is recognized as a separate legal entity
... [even when its members are] engaged in litigation which is personal in
nature[.]" Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446,460,290 S.E.2d 653,662 (1982).
And as with a corporation, our courts "are not free, for the sake of
convenience, to completely ignore the existence of a legal entity, such as
[an] LLC." Keith v. Wallerich, 201 N.C.App. 550,558,687 S.E.2d 299,
304 (2009). As this Court has held,
where a separate legal entity has not been made a party to an
action, the trial court does not have the authority to order that
entity to act. Moreover, even where a named party to an
action is a member-manager of an LLC, the assets of which
are contested in a pending equitable distribution action, the
trial court exceeds its authority when it orders that named
party to transfer the assets of the LLC without first adding the
LLC as a party to the action.
Campbell, 241 N.C.App. at 231-32, 773 S.E.2d at 96 (citation and internal
brackets omitted). Thus, although BBPI was a closely-held corporation
owned by Plaintiff and Defendant, and the subsidiary LLCs owned by
BBPI were managed by Plaintiff, the trial court was not free to ignore the
corporate form nor the existence of the subsidiary LLCs when entering the
equitable distribution order. (Emphasis added).

803 S.E.2d at 175. Ballard, Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., B & C Realty, LLC and S
& R Realty, LLC are separate legal entities. The magistrate court only has personal
jurisdiction over Ballard as an individual, not as a stockholder and/or member of a legal
entity in which he has an interest.

In Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 74 Ark.App. 372, 47 S.W.3d 920 (2001), the
Arkansas Court of Appeals held:
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The fact that one person owns all the stock in a corporation does not
make him and the corporation one and the same. Atkinson v. Reid, 185
Ark. 301, 47 S.W.2d 571 (1932). A corporation and its stockholders are
separate and distinct entities, even though a stockholder may own the
majority of the stock. Thomsen Family Trust v. Peterson Family Enters.,
Inc., 66 Ark.App. 294,989 S.W.2d 934 (1999). A stockholder does not
acguire any estate in the property of a corporation by virtue of his stock
ownership; the full legal and equitable title thereto is in the corporation.
Id (Emphasis added).
47 S.W.3d at 924. In Wendel v. Wendel, 72 S.W.3d 626 (Mo.App. 2002), the Missouri
Court of Appeals held:
Missouri law is clear that a trial "court in a dissolution case may not
exercise control over property belonging to a corporation even if one of the
spouses is the sole shareholder of that corporation." Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 18 S.W.3d 121, 125-26 (Mo.App. S.D. 2000). Otherwise,
the dissolution decree would 11 operate on the property of the corporationan entity not a party to the litigation nor otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the court." Penn v. Penn, 655 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Mo.App.
W.D. 1983). A party who is the sole shareholder of a corporation 11 does
not have legal ownership of the corporation's property; rather, the title
remains in the corporation." Levesque v. Levesque, 773 S.W.2d 220,222
(Mo.App. E.D. 1989). (Emphasis added).
72 S.W.2d at 985.
Idaho recognizes that a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its
shareholders. In Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 158 Idaho
148,345 P.3d 207 (2015), rehearing denied April 9, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court held:

In Washington Federal, a husband and wife financed their development
projects through two entities: an LLC of which they were controlling
members, and a corporation, of which they were controlling shareholders.
Id.. at 652, 289 P .3d at 54. This Court explained that the husband and
wife in their personal capacities, their LLC, and their cor:poration "are all
distinct." Id. at 654, 289 P.3d at 56. "[A] corporation is a separate entity
from its shareholders, 11 just as 11 a limited liability company is a separate
entity from its members." Id. Further, "common control" by the husband
and wife, did not convert the LLC and corporation into a single entity. Id.
(Emphasis added).
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158 Idaho at 153. In First Commercial Bank, N.A. v. Walker, 333 Ark. 100,969 S.W.2d
146 (1998), the Supreme Court of Arkansas held:
There is a near universal rule that a corporation and its stockholders are
separate and distinct entities, even though a stockholder may own the
majority of the stock. Banks v. Jones, 239 Ark. 396,390 S.W.2d 108
(1965). A cotporation has the power to sue and be sued in its coiporate
name. Ark.Code Ann.§ 4-26-204(a)(2) {Repl. 1991). The court of
appeals has stated that a corporation is "a legal entity which, being distinct
from its members, owns the corporate property and owes the corporate
debts, is the creditor to sue or the debtor to be sued, has pemetual
existence, and can act only through its duly constituted organs, primarily
its board of directors." Arkansas Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Rogers, 16 Ark.App. 245,251, 701 S.W.2d 380,383 (1985). (Emphasis
added).
969 S.W.2d at 151.
Throughout the magistrate court's and district court's decisions, Ballard's stock in
Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. and the Salt Lake Property are used interchangeably as
if they are the same asset. This is clear error based upon the above caselaw. The district
court erred when it ruled the magistrate court had jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property.
Therefore, the district court's decision should be reversed, the magistrate court's
Judgments reversed and Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to
Rule 809 dismissed.

B.

The fact that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. dissolved prior to the parties'
divorce is irrelevant as to the ownership of Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.
Again, there is no dispute that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to

the Salt Lake Property at the time of the parties' divorce on April 14, 2003. That is the
date that the community ended. The date of marriage and April 14, 2003 fixed the period
in regard to the nature and character of the assets acquired by the parties. Nothing that
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the parties did after April 14, 2003 could change the nature and character of any property
asset owned by one or both of the parties. Despite the fact that the Salt Lake Property
was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. on the date of the parties' divorce, the
magistrate court concluded as a matter of law as follows:

At the time of the parties' divorce in 2003, SMB was already dissolved and
Ballard had ownership of the SLC Property. 1

(R. p. 303). This conclusion clearly is contradicted by the deed held by Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. (R. pp. 283 - 284). The magistrate court then concluded as a matter of
law as follows:
The court had jurisdiction over the stock contained in SMB the moment
Ballard stipulated that it was a comm.unity asset. The parties both
stipulated on the record in 2007 that SMB was an omitted community
asset.

(R. p. 303). While the magistrate court mischaracterized the stock being stipulated to as
"a community asset," the magistrate court recognized existence of the stock of Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. If Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was dissolved and
therefore, supposedly could not hold a deed to the Salt Lake Property as the magistrate
court had previously concluded as a matter of law, then the stock should have been
irrelevant and of no consequence. Then, the magistrate court made the following
conclusion of law:

1

This Conclusion is clearly in error as Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake
Property at the time of the parties' divorce and pursuant to§ 2010 of the California Corporate Code, Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. continued in existence to dispose of its property. Catalina Investments. Inc. v.
Jones, 98 Cal.App.4th 1, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 2020, 260 - 261 (2007).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 6

The Court clearly had jurisdiction to divide the community portion of
the SMB stock between Ballard and Charlie. This is exactly what
occurred in 2007, pursuant to the express stipulation of the parties.

(R. p. 304). The magistrate court went from Ballard owning the Salt Lake Property to
dividing the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock within four (4) paragraphs.

The district court erroneously affirmed the magistrate court ruling that the Salt
Lake Property was community based upon its ruling Ballard stipulated the Salt Lake
Property was community property in the June 28, 2005 Final Order (R. p. 405), ignoring
the fact that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake Property on
April 14, 2003 and therefore, it was statutorily impossible for the Salt Lake Property to be
community property. The district court essentially joined the magistrate court in
engaging in a quiet title action by ruling Ballard owned the Salt Lake Property because
Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was dissolved. (R. p. 404). The district court took it a
step further by referencing a letter from an attorney to Ballard dated February 28, 1996
referencing a Grant Deed of the transmitter tower area to Ballard's Idaho LLC that had
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been executed, but not recorded. (R. pp. 404 - 405, Petitioner's Exhibit 283).2 Not even
the magistrate court in her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made any findings
regarding Petitioner's Exhibit 283. 3 Neither the magistrate court or the district court had
jurisdiction to directly affect the deed held by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. Utah
Code§ 78B-3-30l{b). In Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
[I]t is well settled that a judgment of a court of one state cannot directly
affect title to realty located in another state.
106 Idaho at 461. Despite the lack of jurisdiction to determine ownership interest in real

2

Charlie argues with regard to the Grant Deed referenced in Ernest Berger's letter (e.g. Petitioner's Exhibit
283) as follows:
While Ballard has never produced the deed, and it has not been recorded, the lack of
recordation does not affect the validity of the deed.
(Respondent's Briefp. 24). Petitioner's Exhibit 283 is part of a 11 document dump" engaged in by Charlie
that is now becoming commonplace in family law proceedings in the state of Idaho as a result of the
adoption of LR.F .L.P. 102.B.2. which does away with the hearsay rule. There is no benefit to objecting
because everything is allowed into evidence and the court then sorts out its relevance. Regardless, Charlie
is attempting to argue a "lost deed." In Krebs v. Krebs. 114 Idaho 571, 759 P.2d 77 (1988), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
The existence of a lost deed is a question of fact provable by extrinsic evidence. Johnson v.
Johnson, 74 N.M. 567,396 P.2d 181 (1964). The proponent of such a deed bears a stiff burden.
He must present clear and convincing evidence of its execution, delivery and contents. Hardine v.
Pioneer National Title Insurance, 1456 Ariz. 83,699 P.2d 1314 (Ct.App. 1985). (Emphasis
added).
114 Idaho at 574. See also, Scott v. Crouch, et al., 24 Utah 377, 67 P. 1068 (1902). There is no evidence
that the 11 Grant Deed" was delivered. Further, there is question as to the contents of the deed. Finally, to
invalidate the Warranty Deed held by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. there would have to be a quiet title
action over which the magistrate court and the state of Idaho would have no jurisdiction, as the Salt Lake
Property is located in the state of Utah.
3

Consideration of Petitioner's Exhibit 283 would have been a violation of the Parole Evidence Rule.
Ballard raised a Parole Evidence Rule Objection at trial of any records introduced into evidence that
contradicted the terms of a deed. (T. p. 171, LL 14 21 ).
N
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property in the state of Utah, the district court erroneously affirmed the magistrate court's
ruling that quieted Sun Mountain Broadcasting, lnc.'s title in the Salt Lake Property. The
district court's decision should be reversed, the Judgments entered by the magistrate court
vacated, and Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809
vacated.
C.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's ruling that the
stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was not Ballard's separate property.
Charlie attempts to circumvent the fact that individuals and corporate entities are

separate and distinct arguing as follows:
The transcript [of the April 20, 2007 hearing] clearly sets forth the
stipulations of the parties. Judge Day was simply commenting that at the
time the original order was entered, if Sun Mountain Broadcasting held the
Salt Lake Property, the Court cannot necessarily reach through a
corporation directly to the assets and award the assets, without
characterizing and awarding the corporation. Therefore, all parties
stipulated before the magistrate court that SMB was an omitted
community asset and that in order to dispose of the asset, Ballard would
transfer the assets of SMB to B&C and then dissolve that entity and sell
the property.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 44). Charlie mischaracterized the ruling Judge Day made on the
record, as well as what the parties were stipulating to do. First, the parties~
stipulated that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was a community asset. The only time
that the word "community" was mentioned in the transcript was when Judge Day stated:
. THE COURT: Just so the record is clear about technically, legally
what is going on here is they're - part of the final order, back in June of
2005, had to do with the division of the property that we have been
referring to, generally, as the Salt Lake property.
In fact, the court may not have had jurisdiction to divide that
property because that property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
which was a separate corporation. It was not owned individually by either
party or as community property. (Emphasis added).
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(R. p. 493, p. 20, LI. 12 - 21). The magistrate court has never made an adjudication that
the stock held by Ballard in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. is community property.
The fact that Ballard stipulated the stock was an "omitted asset" has no relevance as to
whether the stock was either separate or community property. In Beny v. Beny~ 216
Cal.App.3d 1155, 265 Cal.Rptr. 338 (1989), the California Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District held:
In Casas v. Thompson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 141,228 Cal.Rptr. 33,
720 P .2d 621, the court states: *Henn authorizes an independent action to
partition omitted pensions only if the nonemployee spouse had a divisible
interest in the asset at the time of the original decree.* The court explains
the character of the asset is established at the time of its acquisition and
that character is not altered when the asset is omitted from the divorce
decree. If the omitted asset was a community property asset, that
unadjudicated property right continued in the form of a tenancy in
common. In contrast, if there was no community interest at the time of the
divorce decree, there is nothing to partition. (Id. at p. 138,228 Cal.Rptr.
33, 720 P.2d 921; see Shaver v. Shaver (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 788, 794,
165 Cal.Rptr. 672) (Emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
216 Cal.App.3d at 1160.
Paragraph 2 of the Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing filed May 14, 2007,
hereinafter "2007 Order," was entered based upon a determination that Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. was an omitted asset as it was not referenced in the Final Order filed
on June 28, 2005. Therefore, the character of the stock Ballard held in Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. clearly had not been adjudicated. The 2007 Order did not adjudicate
the character of Ballard's stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. The district court, in
its Opinion on Appeal stated:
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There is nothing in Judge Day's Order that specifies the Salt Lake Property
was not community property or that the court did not have jurisdiction
over it.

(R. p. 410). This does not constitute an adjudication of the character of the Salt Lake
Property. Further, Judge Day made it very clear at the April 20, 2007 hearing the court
had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property and B & C Realty and that the Salt Lake
Property was not community property. In order for the magistrate court to determine
whether it had jurisdiction over the stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., a
determination had to be made as to whether the stock was community property. Ballard
raised this issue on several occasions while defending Charlie's modification action. The
magistrate court erroneously made the following Finding of Fact:

19. Ballard's statement that SMB was an "omitted" community asset
was placed on the record in front of Judge Day in 2007. (Footnote
omitted).

(R. p. 295). This finding constitutes clear error as the transcript of the April 20, 2007
clearly fails to contain a stipulation by Ballard that his stock in Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. was community property. As set forth above, the only time the word
"community" was stated at the April 20, 2007 hearing was when Judge Day stated that the
Salt Lake Property "was not owned ... as community property." (R. p. 493, p. 20, LL 20

- 21).
The magistrate court then went on to erroneously conclude as a matter of law as
follows:
The court had jurisdiction over the stock contained in SMB the moment
Ballard stipulated that it was a community asset. The parties both
stipulated on the record in 2007 that SMB was an omitted community
asset. (Emphasis added).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 11

(R. p. 303). Clearly the magistrate court recognized that it had to have jurisdiction over
Ballard's Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock before it could proceed any further.
Unfortunately, both the magistrate court and the district court failed to recognize that the
character of the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock had not been previously
adjudicated. Because Charlie was seeking to modify paragraph 3 of the Order Dismissing
Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing, hereinafter "2008 Order,"
by her Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 filed September 16, 2013, and
subsequent amended Petitions, the magistrate court was required to determine whether it
had jurisdiction to enter the 2007 and 2008 Orders. In Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 870
P.2d 1331 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court held:

In limited circumstances, a property division may be modified contrary
to the bar ofresjudicata using I.R.C.P. 60(b). See Harper v. Harper, 122
Idaho 535, 537, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Ct.App. 1992). See also Allen v.
Allen, 645 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1982); In re Marriage ofParks, 48
Wash.App. 166,737 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1987) (stating that a motion under
rule 60{b) is "ancillary to or a continuation of the original suit" and so long
as the Court had jurisdiction originally, jurisdiction continues for pWJ;>oses
of rule 60(b)); Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1992).
(Emphasis added).
125 Idaho at 376. I.R.F.L.P. 809 is identical to I.R.C.P. 60(b). If the court did not have
jurisdiction to enter the Order(s) sought to be modified, the court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain a Petition to Modify.
Charlie argues in her Respondent1s Brief as follows:
[T]here is no law in Idaho, and Ballard has cited to no legal authority
by way of rule, statute or case law that would require that a stipulation or a
court order must include a designation of the character of the asset being
divided. If an issue is not supported by any factual showing or by
submission of legal authority, it is not presented for the trial court's
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decision. Balser v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 110 Idaho
37, 40, 714 P.2d 6, 9 (1986). If this argument being urged by Ballard had
any merit, then most divorce decrees would be subject to collateral attack
years after they are entered. In many, many divorce cases, parties forgo
making a separate property claim where the claim may arise, and instead
stipulate to divide or even allocate the asset to the other spouse. Very
rarely do the court orders dividing property ever explicitly state than an
asset (or a debt) is designated as "community11 or "separate".
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 44 - 45). Ballard has previously cited substantial legal authority
that a court must adjudicate the character of an asset in a divorce action before it can
divide that asset. Charlie fails to understand the application of the law requiring that the
character of an asset must be adjudicated to establish the magistrate court's jurisdiction in
a divorce action. In Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 586 P .2d 1068 (1978),
the Idaho Supreme Court held:
[T]he defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is never
waived (I.R.C.P. 12(h)); pmportedjudgments entered by a court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter are void and as such are subject to
collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states under
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution
(Restatement of Judgments, s 7 (1942)).
99 Idaho at 626. For a magistrate court to have jurisdiction over an item of property in a
divorce action, the property must be community property. In Pringle v. Pringle, 109
Idaho 1026, 712 P.2d 727 (1985), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that a court in a divorce
action does not have jurisdiction over separate property of a spouse holding:
However, Idaho law does not confer such authority. Idaho Code§ 32-903
flatly declares that property owned before marriage 11 shall remain separate
property. The statutes governing distribution of property upon divorce,
I.C. §§ 32-712 to 32-714, provide only for disposition of 0community
property." These statutes have been interpreted restrictively by our
Supreme Court. In Radermacher v. Radermacher, 61 Idaho 261, 273-74,
100 P.2d 955, 961 (1940), the Court said that ajudge "is without power to
award the separate property of the husband to the wife, either permanently
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or temporarily." In Heslip v. Heslip, 74 Idaho 368,372,262 P.2d 999,
1002 (1953), a similar admonition was delivered: 11 [The] court has the
power under [I.C. § 32-712] to divide the community property between the
parties, but has no power or authority to award the wife's separate
property, or any part of it, to the husband."
I 09 Idaho at 1027. The Idaho Supreme Court went on to state in Pringle:

In contrast, we find that decisions from California are instructive. The
statutes of that state, like those of Idaho, authorize the division of
community property in a divorce but contain no reference to distributing
separate property. See Cal.Code Civil§ 4800. The California Supreme
Court long has held that divorce courts have "no jurisdiction" over
separate property. Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal. 274, 44 Pac. 564 (1896). That
view is still echoed by California appellate courts today. E.g., Buford v.
Buford,202 Cal.Rptr. 20, 155 Cal.App.3d 74 (1984); Porter v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal.Rptr. 59, 73 Cal.App.3d 793 (1977). (Emphasis added).
109 Idaho at 1028. Charlie's argument that there does not need to be a finding that
property being divided by a court in a divorce action is community property defies logic,
as failure to make such a finding does subject divorce decrees to collateral attacks.

4

The magistrate court's second and third Findings of Fact in this action were as
follows:
2. Ballard owned stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. (a
California corporation, and hereinafter, 11 SMB"). In 1985, SMB acquired a
little over 53 acres of property in Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter referred
to as "SLC Property11 ). The SLC Property originally consisted of one legal
parcel.
3. Ballard and Charlie were married to one another on January 23,
1988.
(R. p. 292). These Findings of Fact clearly established that the stock Ballard held in Sun

4

Charlie's conclusory statement that ... "Very rarely do the court orders dividing property explicitly state
that an asset (or a debt) is designated as "community" or "separate" ... has no basis in fact. (Respondent's
Briefp. 45). Such language regarding the property being "community" is imperative.
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Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was his separate property as Ballard had acquired the stock
prior to marriage. Therefore, the magistrate court was clearly aware that a jurisdictional
issue existed in regard to Ballard's Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock. There has
never been a judgment adjudicating the character of Ballard's Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. stock as having been transmuted and that it had become 11 community
property." Therefore, it is impossible under Idaho law for the magistrate court to have
obtained jurisdiction over the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock.
Based upon the magistrate court's Findings of Fact numbers 2 and 3, the district
court erred in affirming the magistrate court's decision that the court had jurisdiction over
the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock. Therefore, the district court's decision should
be reversed, the magistrate court's Judgments vacated and Charlie1s Second Amended
Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 should be dismissed.

D.

Charlie's argument that Ballard is estopped from claiming the 11 asset 11 is his
separate property has no merit.
Charlie argues as follows:
Ballard is estopped by law from changing his position now by the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 45). The "asset" Charlie is referring to is not entirely clear. Later
in her argument, she argues:
Ballard cannot now change his position and assert that the property is
his sole and separate property.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 46). If Charlie is referring to the Salt Lake Property, Ballard's
position has always been that he has no interest in the Salt Lake Property as the Salt Lake
Property has never been deeded in his name. Utah Code§ 25-5-1 is very clear that unless
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a person holds a deed to a parcel of real property, that person has no interest. Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake Property at the time of the
parties1 divorce.
If Charlie is referring to the stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., Ballard
owned his shares of stock prior to the parties' marriage. Charlie was well aware of this
fact. Therefore, estoppel does not apply as the first element of estoppel is that ... "the
party claiming the estoppel ... lacks knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question ...

11

Boesigerv. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,559,381 P.2d 802,

806 (1963). Charlie makes no argument that the first element applies to her claim.
Charlie was very aware that Ballard acquired his stock in Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc. prior to marriage. Further, it has never been adjudicated that Ballard's Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. stock was community property. Charlie's estoppel argument has no
merit.

II.
CHARLIE HAS NO STANDING TO MAKE ANY CLAIMS REGARDING THE
SALT LAKE PROPERTY
Charlie argues that Ballard has waived any claims regarding her standing because
that claim was not raised in previous proceedings and is therefore waived. In Paslay v. A
& B Irrigation District, 162 Idaho 866, 406 P .3d 878 (2017), the Idaho Supreme Court
held:
Since standing is jurisdictional, it can be raised at any time, and the Court
has a duty to raise it sua sponte. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734,
738,274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012) (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added).
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162 Idaho at 870. Clearly Ballard can raise the issue on appeal. Charlie then goes on to
argue as follows:
According to Ballard, Charlie lacked standing to file a motion under
Rule 809 because "she has never held title to the Salt Lake Property" and
"Title to the Salt Lake Property has always been held by a third party legal
entity (e.g. Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. at the time of the parties'
divorce and S&R Realty, LLC at the time oftrial) 11 These statements are,
at best, misleading as Ballard conveniently omits the fact that title to the
property was held by B&C by virtue of a deed executed by Ballard.
Ballard and Charlie are the only members of B&C.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 40). The fact that B & C Realty, LLC may have held title to the
Salt Lake Property several years after the parties' divorce does not give Charlie standing
as she still had no interest in the Salt Lake Property. See Utah Code§ 25-5-1. Charlie
and B & C Realty, LLC are not one in the same. See Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada
County Board of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 153, 345 P.3d 207 (2015) holding 11 a
limited liability company is a separate entity from its members." In 2008, Idaho Code §
53-633 codified a limited liability company's ownership in property. In In the Matter of
the Protest of***, Petitioners 2007 WL 2076991 (Id. St. Tax Com.), the Idaho State Tax
Commission ruled as follows:
Idaho Code§ 53-633 addresses the ownership of the assets of a limited
liability company as follows:
Ownership of a limited liability company property. (I) Property transferred to or otherwise acquired by a limited liability
company is property of the limited liability company and not the members
individually.
(2) Property may be acquired, held and conveyed in the name of the
limited liability company. Any interest in real property may be acquired in
the name of the limited liability company, and title to any interest so
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acquired shall vest in the limited liability company rather than in the
members individually.
2007 WL 2076991. The Idaho Limited Liability Company Act has been amended twice
since the above-entitled case was decided, but the same still holds true. A limited
liability company member has no individual ownership interest in property held by a
limited liability company. Therefore, Charlie's argument has no legal basis. Regardless,
Charlie's standing must be determined at the date of divorce as that is when the
community ended. Charlie had no interest in either Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.'s
stock and/or the Salt Lake Property on the date of divorce.
Charlie cites Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6 (2018) and
attempts to equate it to this action. Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6
(2018) involved a probate action, not a divorce action. The magistrate court in a probate
action has broad authority over estate property, unlike the authority granted in Idaho Code
§ 32-712 which only gives the magistrate court authority to divide the community
property of the parties. 5 Charlie's argument regarding her having standing has no merit.
Because Charlie has no standing, the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate
court's jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property. The district court should be reversed and
the Judgment(s) entered by the magistrate court vacated.

5

The winding up of a dissolved limited liability company is codified in Idaho Code § 30-25-702. The
"new" B & C Realty, LLC has yet to be dissolved yet the magistrate court is overseeing its dissolution. The
district court is the court of competent jurisdiction to oversee a dissolution. Idaho Code§ 30-25-702(e).
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Ill.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S RULING THAT IT HAD THE JURISDICTION TO APPOINT
A RECEIVER

Charlie argues that the district court did not err when it affirmed that the
magistrate court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. (Respondent's Brief, p. 46). Idaho
Code§ 1-2208 sets forth the matters that may be assigned to be heard by the magistrate
court. Charlie argues as follows:
The 2008 Order directed that B & C be wound up and dissolved, it is not
uncommon for a receiver to be appointed in dissolution of limited liability
companies.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 46). Nowhere in Idaho Code§ 1-2208 does the magistrate court
have the authority to adjudicate the dissolution of a limited liability company. 6 Idaho
Code§ 30-25-702 provides in part:

30-25-702. Winding up. - (a) A dissolved limited liability company
shall wind up its activities and affairs and, except as otherwise provided in
section 30-25-703, Idaho Code, the company continues after dissolution on
for the purpose of winding up.

*

*

*

(e) The district court may order judicial supervision of the winding up
of a dissolved limited liability company, including the appointment of a
person to wind up the company's activities and affairs: (Emphasis added).
Only the district court can order judicial supervision. The magistrate court is not a court
of competent jurisdiction to dissolve a limited liability company.

6

Nowhere in the domestic relations statutes is the magistrate court given the authority to dissolve a legal
entity (e.g. a limited liability company).
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Further, even if an Idaho Court has the statutory authority to appoint a receiver,
certain facts must be plead to give the court jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. Cronan v.
District of Kootenai County~ 15 Idaho 184, 96 P. 768, 776 (1908). Charlie argues that
Cronan is not applicable and that Idaho is a notice pleading state. (Respondent's Brief, p.
47). In Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,229 P.3d 1164 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
"Though this Court will make every intendment to sustain a complaint
that is defective, e.g., wrongly captioned or inartful, a complaint cannot be
sustained if it fails to make a short and plain statement of a claim upon
which relief may be granted." Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs Dep't, 139
Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003). "The key issue in determining the
validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the
claims brought against it. 11 Id. "'A cause of action not raised in a party's
pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be
considered for the first time on appeal.;" Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc.,
141 Idaho 604,613, 114 P.3d 974,983 (2005) (quoting Edmondson v.
Shearer Lumber Prod, 139 Idaho 172, 178, 75 P.3d 733, 739 (2003)).
148 Idaho at 807. The Idaho Supreme Court further held:
Although a complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief nor
include a formal statement of the cause of action being pursued, there must
be some indication of the theory of recovery supporting the relief sought a naked recitation of the facts alone is insufficient. Without a clear and
concise statement sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the
plaintiffs theories of recovery that must be defended against, whether in
the body of the complaint or in the prayer for relief, it cannot be said that a
cause of action was sufficiently pied. Even under the liberal notice
pleading standard, a complaint must reasonably imply the theory upon
which relief is being sought. See Dewey v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. JO, 95
Wash.App. 18,974 P.2d 847,851 (1999).
148 Idaho at 808. With regard to the appointment of a receiver, Charlie pied one (1)
sentence. That sentence is as follows:
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In the alternative, Charlie requests that a mutually agreeable receiver be
appointed to handle the approximately forty-eight unsold acres that remain
and that the net proceeds be divided equally.
(R. p. 281 ). From this single sentence, the magistrate court appointed a receiver to sell
real property in which neither of the parties has ever held a deed; gave the receiver power
to transfer the Salt Lake Property from a legal entity that has never done business in the
state ofldaho and was not a party to the above-entitled action (see Appendix 11 A 11 to
Appellant's Brief) to another legal entity that had to be formed; gave the receiver
authority to dissolve a limited liability company; gave the receiver the authority to
perform an accounting in regard to rents and expenses in regard to the Salt Lake Property,
thereby modifying retroactively the 2008 Order in regard to accountings by Ballard that
were never objected to as required by the 2008 Order, etc. Nowhere in Charlie's pleading
was any legal theory given as to why a receiver needed to be appointed, let alone the
powers that the receiver would be granted. Charlie's Second Amended Petition to
Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 sought to enforce the 2008 Order, not modify it. The
relief the magistrate court granted was not a modification of the 2008 Order so that it no
longer had prospective application. The magistrate court concluded as a matter of law
that ... "the appointment of a receiver is necessary to effectuate the 2007 Order and 2008
Order. (R. p. 307). The district court affirmed the magistrate court when it cited caselaw
as follows:

See also Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 88_0, 292 P.3d 264,271
(2012) ("Every court has the authority to enforce its orders as issued.
Idaho law provides that every court has the power to compel obedience to
its judgments, orders and process[.]");

(R. p. 417).
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Charlie further argues in her Respondent's Brief as follows:
Second, the case at hand does not involve the insolvency of a corporation,
but rather involves Idaho Code Sections 8-604(3) and (4) [8-601(3) and
4)].
Respondent's Brief, p. 48. Idaho Code § 8-601 (3) and (4) provide in part:

8-601. Grounds for appointment. -A receiver may be aupointed by
the court in which an action is pending or has passed to judgment, or by
the judge thereof:
3. After judgment to carry the judgment into effect.
4. After judgment to dispose of the property according to the judgment.
Nothing in Idaho Code § 8-60 I 3. and 4. allows a court to modify a judgment to appoint a
receiver. The appointment of a receiver is an enforcement action, not a modification
action and such an action must be properly plead for the court to have the jurisdiction to
make such an appointment. The jurisdictional requirement was not plead so the
magistrate court should not have granted Charlie any relief.
The district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's decision to appoint a
receiver should be reversed, the Judgments entered by the magistrate court vacated and
Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 dismissed.

IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST BALLARD FOR $112,125.00

In its Conclusions of Law, the magistrate court ruled as follows:
Charlie is entitled to receive one-half of the net proceeds for the sale of
the 6 acres that Ballard has withheld from her, in direct violation of the
2007 Order and the 2008 Order. She is entitled to judgment in the amount
of $112,125.00. If there are any claimed outstanding commissions owed
to Charlie Davis, Ballard is solely responsible for payment of the same.
(Emphasis added).
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(R. p. 306). The magistrate court made a finding of fact that the six (6) acres sold for

$224,250.00 which is the gross proceeds from the sale, notthe net proceeds. (R. p. 300,
paragraph 43). The magistrate court then concluded as a matter of law as follows:

In this case, Charlie is a creditor to whom funds are owed. The
appointment of a receiver is necessary to effectuate the 2007 Order and the
2008 Order. A legitimate sale of the remaining 48 acres is long overdue.
This is also the only way that Charlie will ever receive a true accounting of
what happened to the lease proceeds and to assure that she receives her
one-half of the net proceeds of the sale of the six acres. (Emphasis added).
Clearly the magistrate court determined that an accounting needs to take place to
determine what the net proceeds of the 6 acres consisted of after considering truces,
expenses, etc. 7 As set forth in Appellant's Brief, p. 29, through 2012, the property taxes
exceeded the rent proceeds. Through 2007, the property taxes were kept current by
Ballard. (Petitioner's Exhibit 203).
Charlie argues in regard to the $112,125.00 Judgment as follows:
Ballard's argument appears to lie in the nature of an accounting dispute
about taxes and expenses on the property. However, the Court has
appointed the receiver to address these expenses when it distributes the
funds. This is not even ripe. The Order Re: Receiver Duties entered on
March 23, 2018, provides at Paragraph 4(A)(b) that the receiver shall
"undertake an accounting relating to the Property ... to determine all
income and reasonable expenses accruing during that time period for
purposes of doing a final accounting. (Emphasis added).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 54). A final judgment was entered against Ballard which is
accruing judgment interest for the gross proceeds from the sale of six acres owned by a

7

The magistrate court made a Finding of Fact that Ballard used $106,923.23 to pay property taxes for
years 2008 through 2012. (R p. 300). From the date of the parties' divorce on April 14, 2003 through
2012, Charlie did not pay any of the property taxes owed on the Salt Lake Property despite the fact that the
yearly lease amount paid by Clear Channel (now iHeart) did not cover the property taxes. (T. p. 372, LI. 2 20; Respondent's Exhibit KK, p. 32, L. 16 - p. 33, L. 13; p. 36, L. 23 - P. 37, L. 4).
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third party legal entity and Charlie is arguing that the judgment is not ripe for an appeal
until the actual net proceeds are determined after a receiver does an accounting. Clearly a
judgment should not have been entered as the net proceeds from the sale have yet to be
determined.
Further, the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to award Charlie, as a
creditor, a judgment or $112,125.00. There is no statute in the Domestic Relations Act in
Idaho that gives the magistrate court such authority. The $112,125.00 Judgment against
Ballard should be vacated. The district court clearly erred in affirming the $112,125.00
Judgment and its decision should be reversed.
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CHARLIE
Charlie argues in her Respondent's Brief as follows:
Ballard asserts that Charlie could not be the prevailing party because
she "dropped her biggest claim" which is not true. The only "claim"
brought by Charlie was a request to modify the prior orders under Rule
809 and for the court to either order a buyout or a receiver. These
alternative requests were relief sought, not claims. Moreover, it made no
bearing on any of Ballard's arguments, because he maintained the same
position and argument at trial - which was an alleged lack of jurisdiction
for the court to do anything. (Emphasis added).
Respondent's Brief, p. 56.

A.

Charlie did not prevail on all of her claims for relief.
Charlie apparently does not understand what constitutes a claim for relief. Rule

208.A. of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure provides:
A. Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
shall contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which
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the court's jurisdiction depends; 8 (2) a short and plain statement of the
9
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment or decree for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be demanded. (Emphasis
added).
Charlie requested three (3) separate claims for relief. The first was for the Salt Lake
Property to be appraised and Ballard be awarded the Salt Lake Property at the appraised
value and be ordered to pay Charlie one-half of that appraised value. The second claim
for relief, which was in the alternative, was that a ... receiver be appointed to "handle"
the approximately forty-eight unsold acres. The third claim for relief was for Charlie to
be awarded a money judgment against Ballard for one-half the fair market value of
approximately eight acres of the 54 acres that Ballard sold. (R. pp. 280 - 284).
The first claim for relief was plead by Charlie in her Petition to Modify Order
Pursuant to Rule 809 filed September 16, 2013. (R. pp. 230 - 231). This was Charlie's
sole claim for relief until she filed her Second Amended Petition to Modify Order
Pursuant to Rule 809 filed January 25, 2017. (R. pp. 280 - 284). For over three (3) years
and four (4) months, the parties litigated solely over Charlie's first claim for relief. Then,
on the second day of trial, Charlie dropped her first claim for relief. (T. p. 176, LL 2 - 7).
As such, Ballard clearly prevailed on Charlie's claim that the Salt Lake Property should be
appraised and he should be ordered to pay her one-half of that appraised value.

8

10

Charlie failed to plead in her Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends (e.g. why the court had any jurisdiction over the Salt
Lake Property and what jurisdiction the magistrate court had in a divorce action to award a judgment to a
"creditor" in excess of$10,000.00.
9
No such statement was plead.
10
The magistrate court had no authority to grant Charlie her first claim for relief as it would have had to
order Ballard to pay Charlie with his separate property to buy out Charlie's interest. The magistrate court
has no jurisdiction over separate property. Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P .2d 727 ( 1985).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 25

Because Ballard prevailed on Charlie's first claim for relief, his defense to
Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 was not
defended unreasonably, frivolously or without foundation. The fact that Charlie prevailed
on her alternate claim for relief, for which she plead no basis, regarding the appointment
of a receiver to "handle" the Salt Lake Property is irrelevant to her claim for attorney's
fees. Up until Charlie dropped her first claim for relief, Ballard was defending having to
buy out Charlie's interest in a very undesirable parcel of real estate that has questionable
value. The magistrate court's appointment of a receiver had far less of a financial impact
than if Ballard had been ordered to pay Charlie one-half of the appraised value of the Salt
Lake Property. In fact, Charlie's first claim for relief was Charlie's largest claim for relief.
The district court clearly erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of attorney's
fees on the basis that Charlie was the prevailing party and his defense was unreasonable,
frivolous and without foundation.
B.

The district court erred when it ruled the magistrate court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded Charlie attorney's fees.

In Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902,367 P.3d 1214 (2016), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
"To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion
consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision
through the exercise ofreason. 11 Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,472,
299 P.3d 781, 784 (2013).
3 67 P .3d at 1221. The legal standard to determine whether attorney's fees should be
awarded pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 is whether Ballard's defense was frivolous,
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unreasonable or without foundation. Charlie argues that Ballard's actions in regard to the
2007 and 2008 orders is relevant in determining whether Charlie was entitled to attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. (Respondent's Brief, p. 57). Charlie argues as
follows:
The district court properly rejected his argument and held that, "[t]he
magistrate also did not abuse its discretion in finding that the appellant's
conduct was in violation of the court orders, which culminated in the
respondent seeking her petitions to modify. 11 Further, the district court
explained, "... had [Ballard] complied with the terms of the court's orders,
the disposition of the property would not have taken more than ten years to
accomplish and his opposition to the sale of the property, which includes
his assertions of arguments that are without foundation.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 57). Ballard's "course of conduct" in regard to the court orders,
etc. is not relevant in regard to whether attorney's fees should be awarded pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121. Charlie continues her argument as follows:
More importantly, for the purposes of the legal argument, Ballard
argues that the magistrate could only consider whether Ballard's entire
defense of Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant
to Rule 809 filed on January 25, 2017, and that the magistrate court should
not have considered Ballard's "course of conduct" in deciding on fees. In
fact, the trial court is required to consider the entire course of the litigation
in assessing an award of attorney fees under Section 12-121. The case law
provides that the "entire course of the litigation must be taken into
account." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 57).

11

Course of conduct" and "course oflitigation" are two (2)

entirely separate events. The latter involves matters relating to pleadings and arguments
made during litigation. The former relates to a person or entities conduct outside of
litigation. The magistrate court abused its discretion when it considered Ballard's
"conduct" outside of litigation instead of solely focusing on Ballard's legal arguments and
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positions during the course of litigation in making its determination to award Charlie
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. The district court erred when it affirmed
the magistrate court's award of attorney's fees to Charlie. In Severson v. Hermann, 116
Idaho 497, 777 P.2d 269 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
An award of attomey1s fees is only proper when an action is either
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines Inc, 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986);
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). The sole question is whether the losing party's position
is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, 106 Idaho 905,684
P.2d 307 (1984). (Emphasis added).
1

116 Idaho at 498. Ballard's position in defending against Charlie's Petitions to Modify
was the same as the issues Judge Day ruled on at the April 20, 2007 hearing. Judge Day's
ruling was clearly well founded and not frivolous. While the magistrate court may have
disagreed with Ballard's course of conduct in regard to his actions as an officer of Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. that conduct is an entirely different issue than the legal
positions he took during litigation.
The district court's affirmation of the magistrate court's award of attorney's fees
should be reversed and the magistrate court's Judgment for Attorney's Fees vacated.
VI.
BALLARD DID NOT WANE HIS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ARGUMENT
RELATING TO THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S COST AWARD
Charlie argues as follows:
The district court, in reviewing the issue of the cost award, found that
"the appellant has failed to apply the abuse of discretion standard factors to
the magistrate's cost award in this case. This constitutes a waiver of his
abuse of discretion cost contentions." Curiously, Ballard articulates no
argument regarding this holding by the district court. Instead, he ignores it
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entirely and simply readdresses the magistrate court's finding below.
Ballard waives his argument.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 58 - 59). Charlie ignores footnote 17 on page 36 of Appellant's
Brief that cites to the Appellant's Brief filed in the district court that raised the abuse of
discretion issue. Ballard specifically cited the standard regarding the court's discretion in
his Appellant's Brief filed with the district court. (Aug. P. 178). He then cited I.R.F.L.P.
90 l .D. as the ruling the magistrate court had to follow when awarding discretionary costs.
(Aug. P. 213). He then argued the magistrate court failed to make the findings required
by I.R.F.L.P. 901.D. before discretionary costs could be awarded. (Aug. P. 214).
Charlie's argument is at best misleading and at worst fallacious. Ballard did not waive the
issue regarding the award of discretionary costs on appeal to the district court. The
district court clearly erred when it ruled Ballard had waived his appeal as to discretionary
costs being awarded to Charlie.
Charlie further argues that the district court did not err on appeal when it affirmed
the magistrate court's award of discretionary costs arguing as follows:
The district court found that, "The appellant, therefore, has failed to
show prejudice to a substantial right, where these costs were available as
discretionary costs and where the magistrate made express findings as to
the general character of the requested costs as reasonable and necessary.
(R. p. 432). (Emphasis added).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 59). I.R.F.L.P. 901.D. required the magistrate court to make
findings prior to awarding discretionary costs as follows:
The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs
contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to
why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be
allowed.
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The magistrate court clearly failed to follow the requirements ofl.R.F.L.P. 901.D. and the
district court subverted LR.F.L.P. 901.D. when it ruled 11 the magistrate court made
express findings as to the general character of the requested costs as reasonable and
necessary. 11 (R. p. 432). I.R.F.L.P. 901.D. requires a showing that the costs were ...
"necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred." No such finding was ever made
by the magistrate court as to each discretionary cost and therefore, the district court erred
when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of discretionary costs. The district court's
ruling affirming the magistrate court's award of costs should be reversed and the
magistrate court's Judgment for Costs vacated.
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S DECISION TO CONSIDER THREE SEPARATE MEMORANDUMS
OF COSTS FILED BY CHARLIE
Charlie filed three separate Memorandums of Costs (Aug. Pp. 1 - 135). The first
was filed by Todd Jenson, an attorney from the state of Utah. Charlie argues in regard to
Todd Jenson's Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs filed April 5, 2018 as follows:
The district court also found that Ballard failed to cite any legal
authority in support of his assertion that Todd Jenson could not submit a
memorandum of fees because he is an out-of-state attorney. "This Court
does not consider issues that are not accompanied by citation to authority."
(R. p. 431).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 60). Sometimes it is hard to articulate proof that a "wheel is
round." Rule 212 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure provides:

Rule 212. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Sanctions; Electronic Signatures.
A. Documents to be signed. Evezy pleading, motion, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one ( I)
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licensed attorney of record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed.
(Emphasis added).
Todd Jenson signed his Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs. (Aug. Pp. 1 - 14).
Todd Jenson is not an attorney licensed in the state ofldaho to the knowledge of the
drafter of this Brief.

11

No attorney licensed in the state of Idaho signed Todd Jenson's

Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs. Therefore, it should never have been filed
and the courts in the state of Idaho do not have the authority to consider Todd Jenson's
Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs. Further, it should be stricken from the
record. Finally, the district court's decision affirming the Memorandum for Attorney Fees
and Costs signed by Todd Jenson should be reversed and the Judgment awarding
attorney's fees and costs entered by the magistrate court as a result of illicit filing should
be vacated.

vm.
THE DISTRJCT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED CHARLIE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
The district court erred when it awarded Charlie attorney's fees on appeal to the
district court. Charlie first argues Ballard failed to raise as an issue on appeal the district
court's award of attorney's fees on appeal. Rule 17 of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides
in part:

Rule 17. Notice of appeal - Contents.
A notice of appeal shall contain substantially the following
information:

*
11

*

*

An attorney roster search on the Idaho State Bar website does not list Todd Jenson as an Idaho attorney.
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(f) Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the
appellant then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of
issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues
on appeal. (Emphasis added).
Charlie's raising this issue has no merit. Further, Ballard did assign error that the district
court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs as Ballard raised good
faith legal arguments before the district court on appeal. Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho
902, 367 P.3d 1214 (2016). Charlie argues as follows:
As the district court found, 11 The majority of appellant1s argument on
appeal consisted of his effort to assert the magistrate court had no
Jurisdiction' over the Salt Lake property, due to ownership and community
property issues, which had long ago been decided in the case and which
were not appealed from This classifies as frivolous. (R. p. 435).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 62). The district court made its ruling that the Salt Lake Property
was Ballard's property at the time of divorce, ignoring the fact that Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake Property on the day of divorce, based
upon its interpretation that the Final Order stated the Salt Lake Property identified as 48
acres owned by B & C Realty was community property. (R. pp. 354 - 355). The Final
Order identified the Salt Lake Property as 48 acres. (R. p. 158, L. 5). The magistrate
court found the Salt Lake Property consisted of a little over 53 acres. (R. p. 292, Finding
of Fact 2).
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the Salt Lake Property consisting of
48 acres set forth in the Final Order filed on June 28, 2005 and the Salt Lake Property set
forth in Finding of Fact 2 filed on January 29, 2018 consisting of 53 acres are the same in
that the 48 acres is part of the 53 acres, which 48 of the 53 acres is community property
that the district court is saying the magistrate court had jurisdiction over? Even under the
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district court's reasoning in its Opinion on Appeal, there are at least five (5) acres that the
magistrate court had no jurisdiction over. Clearly the district court's reasoning on appeal
does not fit the facts, even under its erroneous conclusion that the Final Order adjudicated
the Salt Lake Property to be community property despite the fact that the parties did not
own it.
Unfortunately, the Salt Lake Property has never been identified in any court order
and/or judgment entered in the above-entitled action. In Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,
261 P.2d 815 (1953), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
A judgment which affects the title or interest in real property must
describe the lands specifically and with such certainty that the court's
mandate in connection therewith may be executed, and such that rights and
liabilities are clearly fixed and that all parties affected thereby may readily
understand and comply with the requirements thereof.
74 Idaho at 307. The Final Order identified the Salt Lake Property as owned by B & C
Realty. That clearly was not accurate. That is as close as a judgment and/or order has
come to identifying the Salt Lake Property. There has never been a judgment and/or
order that has described the Salt Lake Property as is required by Kosanke v. Kopp~
making any judgments regarding the Salt Lake Property defective. However, since Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake Property on the date of the
parties' divorce, the only adjudication required is that it is not community property
because it was owned by a third party entity and the court has no jurisdiction over the Salt
Lake Property.
The district court's award of attorney's fees to Charlie on appeal should be vacated
as Ballard's legal position was not unreasonable, frivolous and without foundation.
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IX.
CHARLIE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Charlie argues that she should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 12-107; Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(4), 35(b)(5)
and 41; and I.R.F .L.P. 908 on the basis that Ballard makes no cogent legal argument
justifying reversal of the district court's decision. Charlie argues that Ballard is requesting
that the Idaho Supreme Court to second guess the district court.
Ballard's jurisdictional arguments are well grounded in law and he has cited
substantial authority to support those arguments. Charlie has cited little if any authority
to refute Ballard's arguments. In Severson v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 777 P.2d 269
(1989), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
An award of attorney's fees is only proper when an action is either
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc, 111 Idaho 594, 726 P .2d 706 (1986);
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). The sole question is whether the losing party's position
is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation. Wingv. Amalgamated Sugar Company, 106 Idaho 905,684
P.2d 307 (1984). (Emphasis added).

116 Idaho at 498.
Ballard is not asking the Idaho Supreme Court to second guess the district court as
to its decision. Ballard is asking the Idaho Supreme Court to review the district court's
opinion, and properly apply the law, and reverse the district court's decision. Charlie is
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court1s decision. If the
Supreme Court does not reverse the district court's decision, it will set a precedent that a
magistrate court has unlimited authority over parties in a divorce action and any assets
they own, including assets that are held by third party entities in which the parties have an
interest. Clearly an Idaho Court would have no authority over real property owned by
McDonald's Corporation when parties in a divorce action own McDonald's stock. The
same is true in this action. The district court's decision should be reversed, the
Judgments entered by the magistrate court vacated and Charlie's Second Amended
Petition to Modify Pursuant to Rule 809 dismissed.

.
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